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ESSAY
SORRY SEEMS TO BE THE HARDEST WORD: THE
FAIR SENTENCING ACT OF 2010, CRACK, AND
METHAMPHETAMINE
Kyle Graham *
I. INTRODUCTION
On August 3, 2010, President Obama signed the Fair Sentenc-
ing Act of 2010 into law., This measure eliminated the five-year
mandatory minimum prison sentence that previously adhered
under federal law upon a conviction for possession of five grams
or more of crack cocaine. 2 The Act also increased the amount, in
weight, of crack that must be implicated for either a five- or a ten-
year mandatory minimum sentence to apply upon conviction of
any of several federal drug trafficking crimes.3 The latter provi-
sion significantly reduces the disparity between the amount of
crack that will trigger these mandatory minimums and the
amount of powder cocaine that will produce the same results.4
* Assistant Professor, Santa Clara University School of Law. The author thanks Da-
vid Ball for his input, and Lauren Case and Valerie Perdue for their research assistance.
1. Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (to be codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 21 U.S.C.).
2. Id. § 3, 124 Stat. at 2372 (to be codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 844(a)).
3. Id. § 2, 124 Stat. at 2372 (to be codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1),
960(b)). This article uses the term "trafficking" to distinguish offenses such as drug manu-
facture, sale, importation, or possession for purposes of sale from crimes involving mere
possession of contraband.
4. See id. "Crack [has] an off-white color[,] resembling coagulated soap powder or
pieces of soap. . .. The word 'crack' either comes from the crackling sound made when it is
smoked before it dries or from its occasional resemblance to cracked paint chips or plas-
ter." "Crack" Cocaine: Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the S.
Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 99th Cong. 96 (1986) [hereinafter 1986 Senate Hearing]
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Whereas federal law previously treated one hundred grams of
powder cocaine as the equivalent of one gram of crack for sentenc-
ing purposes, after the Fair Sentencing Act, the statutory ratio
now stands at a mere 18:1.6
The Fair Sentencing Act succeeded where many earlier at-
tempts to revisit the powder-to-crack ratio had failed. Not long af-
ter Congress adopted the quantity thresholds that produced the
100:1 figure back in 1986,6 some observers perceived that the de-
fendants implicated in crack cases, most of whom were African-
American, were being treated with undue harshness as compared
to the white and Latino defendants embroiled in the majority of
cases involving powder cocaine.' Bills that would have addressed
this disparity by reducing the powder-to-crack ratio were intro-
(statement of David L. Westrate, Assistant Administrator of Operations, Drug Enforce-
ment Administration, U.S. Department of Justice). The Supreme Court of the United
States has summarized the similarities of and differences between crack and powder co-
caine:
Crack and powder cocaine are two forms of the same drug. Powder cocaine, or
cocaine hydrochloride, is generally inhaled through the nose; it may also be
mixed with water and injected. Crack cocaine, a type of cocaine base, is
formed by dissolving powder cocaine and baking soda in boiling water. The
resulting solid is divided into single-dose "rocks" that users smoke. The active
ingredient in powder and crack cocaine is the same. The two forms of the
drug also have the same physiological and psychotropic effects, but smoking
crack cocaine allows the body to absorb the drug much faster than inhaling
powder cocaine, and thus produces a shorter, more intense high.
Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 94 (2007) (citations omitted).
5. Compare 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2006) (providing a 100:1 sentencing disparity), with § 2,
124 Stat. at 2372 (to be codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)) (providing a 17.857:1
sentencing disparity). Shortly after the passage of the Fair Sentencing Act, the United
States Sentencing Commission ("Commission") promulgated an emergency amendment to
the United States Sentencing Guidelines ("Guidelines") that brought the Guidelines into
conformance with the Act. Notice of a Temporary, Emergency Amendment to Sentencing
Guidelines and Commentary, 75 Fed. Reg. 66,188, 66,188 (Oct. 27, 2010) (discussing
amendments to U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 2D1.1, 2D2.1).
6. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1002, 100 Stat. 3207, 3207-2 to
3207-3 (1986) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2006)).
7. The 100:1 powder-to-crack ratio inspired a deluge of academic commentary, most
of it critical of the disparity and its implications. E.g., Alyssa L. Beaver, Getting a Fix on
Cocaine Sentencing Policy: Reforming the Sentencing Scheme of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of
1986, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2531, 2548-50 (2010); Knoll D. Lowney, Smoked not Snorted: Is
Racism Inherent in our Crack Cocaine Laws?, 45 WAsH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 121,
121-26 (1994); Andrew N. Sacher, Inequities of the Drug War: Legislative Discrimination
on the Cocaine Battlefield, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 1149, 1149-53 (1997); David A. Sklansky,
Cocaine, Race, and Equal Protection, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1283, 1283-90 (1995); William
Spade, Jr., Beyond the 100:1 Ratio: Towards a Rational Cocaine Sentencing Policy, 38
ARIZ. L. REV. 1233, 1251-56 (1995). For a dissenting view, see Elizabeth Tison, Amending
the Sentencing Guidelines for Cocaine Offenses: The 100-to-1 Ratio Is not as "Cracked" up
as Some Suggest, 27 S. ILL. U. L.J. 413, 429-34 (2003).
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duced in Congress in 1993,8 1995,1 1996,1o 1997,11 1998,12 1999,13
2001," 2002,5 2003,16 2005,7 2006,18 2007,1' 2008,20 and 2009,21 but
these measures and similar proposals offered by the United
States Sentencing Commission ("Commission")22 failed. Even
8. Crack-Cocaine Equitable Sentencing Act of 1993, H.R. 3277, 103d Cong. (1993).
9. Powder-Crack Cocaine Penalty Equalization Act of 1995, H.R. 2598, 104th Cong.
(1995); S. 1398, 104th Cong. (1995); Crack-Cocaine Equitable Sentencing Act of 1995, H.R.
1264, 104th Cong. (1995).
10. H.R. 3196, 104th Cong. (1996).
11. Powder-Crack Cocaine Penalty Equalization Act of 1997, S. 1162, 105th Cong.
(1997); Get Tough on Cocaine Act of 1997, H.R. 2229, 105th Cong. (1997); Crack-Cocaine
Equitable Sentencing Act of 1997, H.R. 2031, 105th Cong. (1997); S. 260, 105th Cong.
(1997); S. 209, 105th Cong. (1997); Powder-Crack Cocaine Penalty Equalization Act of
1997, H.R. 332, 105th Cong. (1997).
12. Powder Cocaine Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Act of 1998, S. 2033, 105th
Cong. (1998); Powder-Crack Cocaine Penalty Equalization Act of 1998, S. 1593, 105th
Cong. (1998).
13. Elimination of the Crack Cocaine Disparate Sentencing Act of 1999, H.R. 1241,
106th Cong. (1999); Crack-Cocaine Equitable Sentencing Act of 1999, H.R. 939, 106th
Cong. (1999); Powder Cocaine Sentencing Act of 1999, S. 146, 106th Cong. (1999).
14. Drug Sentencing Reform Act of 2001, S. 1874, 107th Cong. (2001); Crack-Cocaine
Equitable Sentencing Act of 2001, H.R. 697, 107th Cong. (2001).
15. Powder-Crack Cocaine Penalty Equalization Act of 2002, H.R. 4026, 107th Cong.
(2002).
16. Crack-Cocaine Equitable Sentencing Act of 2003, H.R. 1435, 108th Cong. (2003);
Powder-Crack Cocaine Penalty Equalization Act of 2003, H.R. 345, 108th Cong. (2003).
17. Crack-Cocaine Equitable Sentencing Act of 2005, H.R. 2456, 109th Cong. (2005);
Powder-Crack Cocaine Penalty Equalization Act of 2005, H.R. 1501, 109th Cong. (2005).
18. Drug Sentencing Reform Act of 2006, S. 3725, 109th Cong. (2006).
19. Drug Sentencing Reform and Cocaine Kingpin Trafficking Act of 2007, S. 1711,
110th Cong. (2007); Drug Sentencing Reform Act of 2007, S. 1383, 110th Cong. (2007);
Crack-Cocaine Equitable Sentencing Act of 2007, H.R. 460, 110th Cong. (2007); Powder-
Crack Cocaine Penalty Equalization Act of 2007, H.R. 79, 110th Cong. (2007).
20. Fairness in Cocaine Sentencing Act of 2008, H.R. 5035, 110th Cong. (2008).
21. Fairness in Cocaine Sentencing Act of 2009, H.R. 1459, 111th Cong. (2009); Powd-
er-Crack Cocaine Penalty Equalization Act of 2009, H.R. 18, 111th Cong. (2009); Crack-
Cocaine Equitable Sentencing Act of 2009, H.R. 2178, 111th Cong. (2009).
22. In 1995, the Commission proposed to eliminate the 100:1 ratio, as incorporated
within the Guidelines. Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines for United States
Courts, 60 Fed. Reg. 25,074, 25,075-76 (May 10, 1995); U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N,
SPECIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY xiv (1995) [he-
reinafter 1995 USSC COCAINE REPORT]. Congress rejected this proposal. See Pub. L. No.
104-38, § 1, 109 Stat. 335, 335 (1995) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 994 note (2006)). At the same
time, Congress directed the Commission to consider revision of the powder-crack ratio "in
a manner consistent with the ratios set for other drugs." Id. § 2, 109 Stat. at 335. In 1997,
the Commission recommended adoption of a 5:1 ratio. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SPECIAL
REPORT TO CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY 2 (1997) [hereinafter
1997 USSC COCAINE REPORT]. In 2002, it proposed "at least" a 20:1 ratio. U.S.
SENTENCING COMM'N, REPORT TO CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY
viii (2002) [hereinafter 2002 USSC COCAINE REPORT]. Neither of these recommendations
was adopted by Congress. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, REPORT TO CONGRESS: COCAINE AND
2011] 767
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when persistence finally paid off in 2010, the Fair Sentencing Act
fell short of the stated goal of some members of Congress-
namely, treating powder and crack cocaine as identical for sen-
tencing purposes.1
The Fair Sentencing Act underscores what might seem like an
obvious point: because legislatures devise the penalties that ad-
here to crimes, they retain the power to revisit these punish-
ments when and if changed circumstances suggest that lesser
consequences should follow from commission of the offense. Yet
legislators rarely exercise their prerogative to reduce the penal-
ties previously affixed to crimes, 24 at least absent a judicial com-
mand,25 wholesale reform of a criminal code 2 6 or a recurring fea-
ture thereof that cuts across multiple offenses (such as the
practice of assigning mandatory minimum terms to drug
crimes),"2 crises prompted by fiscal constraints, 28 or outright aboli-
tion of an offense.29 In this respect, "sorry" seems to be the hard-
est word for legislators to say when it comes to the recalibration
FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY 8 (2007) [hereinafter 2007 USSC COCAINE REPORT].
23. E.g., 156 CONG. REC. H6198 (daily ed. July 28, 2010) (remarks of Rep. Clyburn)
(expressing disappointment that the Fair Sentencing Act did not entirely eliminate the
disparate treatment of crack and powder cocaine under federal sentencing law).
24. See, e.g., Julia T. Rickert, Comment, Denying Defendants the Benefit of a Reason-
able Doubt: Federal Rule of Evidence 609 and Past Sex Crime Convictions, 100 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 213, 240 (2010) ("Congress is rarely able to muster the political will to
reduce criminal penalties or advance protections for any criminal defendants, because
members fear that when election time rolls around there will be cries that they have been
soft on crime."').
25. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 446-47 (2008) (barring administra-
tion of the death penalty as punishment for the crime of sexual abuse of a minor).
26. This may occur, for example, when legislatures ratify the work of sentencing
commissions. See Richard S. Frase, State Sentencing Guidelines: Still Going Strong, 78
JUDICATURE 173, 175 (1995) ("Sentencing guidelines were originally conceived as a means
of making sentencing more uniform and eliminating unwarranted disparities."); Michael
Tonry, The Success of Judge Frankel's Sentencing Commission, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 713,
719 (1993) (relating how state sentencing commissions reduced sentences for some of-
fenses while increasing them for others).
27. See ADRIENNE AUSTIN, CRIMINAL JUSTICE TRENDS: KEY LEGISLATIVE CHANGES IN
SENTENCING POLICY, 2001-2010, at 12-13 (2010) (discussing several states' recent reform
of mandatory minimum sentences for drug offenses).
28. See Elizabeth Napier Dewar, The Inadequacy of Fiscal Constraints as a Substitute
for Proportionality Review, 114 YALE L.J. 1177, 1180 (2005) (observing that in 2003, "to
reduce the size of their prison populations," a few states "repeal[ed] mandatory minimums
or otherwise reduc[ed] sentences"). Dewar also observes, however, that "the high political
cost of reducing criminal penalties deters legislators from reducing prison sentences in
general and makes reducing the sentences for some crimes almost impossible." Id. at 1183.
29. See Darryl K. Brown, Democracy and Decriminalization, 86 TEX. L. REV. 223, 233-
45 (2007) (discussing legislative willingness to abolish criminal offenses).
768 [Vol. 45:765
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of criminal penalties. Instead, political forces typically place up-
ward pressure on criminal punishments, or encourage adherence
to the status quo.30 The Fair Sentencing Act represents a note-
worthy departure from this norm. With the Act, Congress back-
tracked from one of the most notorious yet persistent quirks of
the federal sentencing laws.
The Fair Sentencing Act tacked against prevailing winds by
capitalizing upon idiosyncratic circumstances that made the sen-
tencing laws applicable to crack cocaine particularly susceptible
to legislative reconsideration. These conditions included: (1) the
contemporaneous assignment of lesser penalties to powder co-
caine, which would later inspire compelling proportionality ar-
guments; (2) the fact that the penalties initially attached to crack
were loosely premised on untested and potentially rebuttable as-
sertions regarding the dangers associated with this substance; (3)
the aberrant and extreme nature of the 100:1 ratio, relative to
other legislative responses to the crack cocaine "epidemic"; (4) the
fact that the strict crack-cocaine penalties applied principally to
African-American males, a disparate impact that suggested to
some that the nation's drug laws discriminated on the basis of
race and motivated members of Congress to advance legislation
that would eliminate or reduce the ratio; (5) the compromise im-
plicit in the Act, which only reduced the powder-crack disparity,
instead of eliminating the gap altogether; and (6) the decreasing
crime rates of the past two decades, which have made it political-
ly feasible for legislatures to consider the reduction of criminal
penalties attached to some drug crimes.3 '
30. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Essential but Inherently Limited Role of the
Courts in Prison Reform, 13 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 307, 310 (2008).
31. See Robert Weisberg, How Sentencing Commissions Turned Out to Be a Good
Idea, 12 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 179, 181 (2007) ("If it remains risky for politicians to appear
to express sympathy for criminal defendants, it has ceased to be politically suicidal for
them the discuss-even to advocate and carry out-some pragmatically justified reduc-
tions in criminal penalties."). The Federal Bureau of Investigation reports that the num-
ber of violent crimes per 100,000 population peaked at 758.2 in 1991 and has been gradu-
ally declining ever since, to 429.4 per 100,000 population in 2009. FED. BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, 2009 tbl.1, http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius
2009/data/table_01.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2011). Property crimes have experienced a
similar decline. Id. Curiously, a disconnect sometimes appears between crime rates and
public concern over crime. Recent polls reflect increasing concern about crime, even as
crime rates have dropped. See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Jones, Americans Still Perceive Crime as on
the Rise, GALLUP (Nov. 18, 2010), http://www.gallup.com/poll/144827/Americans-perceive-
crime-rise.aspx (last visited Mar. 2, 2011).
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Though one cannot pinpoint the precise contribution of each of
these factors, it seems safe to say that each played an important
role in the passage of the Act. These circumstances created an
environment in which Congress could rethink its earlier decision,
ensured that it would have occasion to do so, and provided specif-
ic reasons why it should take action-without necessarily admit-
ting that its earlier adoption of extremely different penalty provi-
sions for powder and crack cocaine was mistaken, given the facts
known at the time.
No comparable narrative accompanies most crimes. Illustrating
the point, the Fair Sentencing Act left in place sentencing laws
that effectively create a 100:1 sentencing disparity between
powder cocaine and either actual methamphetamine or metham-
phetamine in its crystal "ice" form. A perception now exists that
methamphetamine presents a greater threat to public safety than
crack does. Consistent with this transition, in key respects the
penalties imposed for methamphetamine trafficking crimes are
now precisely the same as the supposedly draconian penalties
previously tethered to crack cocaine. Federal law now calls for a
five-year minimum term for trafficking crimes involving just five
grams of actual (pure) methamphetamine, or methamphetamine
in its "ice" form, and a ten-year minimum sentence for crimes in-
volving fifty grams or more of these forms of methamphetamine.32
There is little reason to believe that the Fair Sentencing Act
will prompt legislative reconsideration of the penalties attached
to methamphetamine offenses. Many of the forces that aligned to
produce the Fair Sentencing Act have no apparent application or
analogs insofar as methamphetamine is concerned. That said, the
Act may open the door to greater judicial scrutiny of the pre-
scribed sentences for methamphetamine crimes. The Act can be
understood as endorsing a form of proportionality analysis whe-
reby the sentences for trafficking in powder cocaine provide a
baseline for determining the reasonableness of sentencing provi-
sions that apply to crimes involving other controlled substances.
Going forward, because federal courts now have the authority to
disagree with policy determinations embedded within the United
States Sentencing Guidelines ("Guidelines") applicable to drug of-
fenses, judges might build upon the Fair Sentencing Act by re-
cognizing and scrutinizing other drug ratios, such as a powder co-
32. See supra notes 120-24 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 45:765770
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caine-to-methamphetamine juxtaposition. If this comparison of
the drugs, their respective penalties, and the dangers associated
with each substance indicates that the policies embraced by the
Guidelines produce excessive penalties, courts could adopt small-
er ratios (i.e., higher quantity thresholds, as they relate to specific
sentencing ranges, for the drug(s) being compared to powder co-
caine) to the extent permitted under federal law. "Sorry" may be
the hardest word to say, but the logic of the Fair Sentencing Act
suggests that some change may come without Congress having to
say anything else at all.
11. THE ORIGINS AND ENACTMENT OF THE POWDER
AND CRACK COCAINE PENALTY PROVISIONS
The cognoscenti "discovered" crack in 1985 3 in the same sense
that Christopher Columbus "discovered" America in 1492; in both
cases, the phenomenon predated the epiphany.34 But just as Co-
lumbus's report of his unexpectedly truncated voyage electrified
its audience, reports of a new form of cocaine that was more po-
tent and insidious than cocaine powder commanded popular no-
tice,35 headlines, 36 and then, predictably, the rapt attention of
Congress. In July 1986, in the midst of a surge of articles regard-
ing the crack "epidemic,">1 both the United States Senate and the
33. 1986 Senate Hearing, supra note 4, at 14 (statement of Charles Schuster, Direc-
tor, National Institute on Drug Abuse) ("In May 1985, NIDA conducted a field investiga-
tion in New York City and initially brought crack to the attention of Federal and State
Authorities."). The first mass-media articles on crack appeared in late 1984. Sklansky, su-
pra note 7, at 1291 (footnotes omitted).
34. 1986 Senate Hearing, supra note 4, at 38 (statement of Michael Taylor) ("Crack is
not something new. It has been around for as long as I can remember."); U.S. DRUG
ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION: A TRADITION OF
EXCELLENCE 1973-2003, at 59-60, http://www.justice.gov/dealpubs/history/1985-1990.
html (last visited Mar. 2, 2011) [hereinafter DEA REPORT]; Beaver, supra note 7, at
2538-39 (discussing the development of crack cocaine and early media coverage of the
drug); see also Rock Cocaine Use in LA Called "Out of Control," ORANGE COUNTY REG.,
Dec. 9, 1984, at B6 ("Hundreds of drug-dispensing fortresses have sprung up in south-
central Los Angeles in the past 18 months, bringing affordable rock cocaine and an epi-
demic of addiction to the inner city.").
35. According to a Gallup survey conducted between July 31, 1986 and August 1,
1986, Americans identified crack as the nation's second most serious problem drug, behind
only alcohol. GEORGE GALLUP, JR., 1986 GALLUP POLL: PUBLIC OPINION 191 (1987).
36. See, e.g., Craig Reinarman & Harry G. Levine, The Crack Attack: Politics and Me-
dia in the Crack Scene, in CRACK IN AMERICA 18, 20 (Craig Reinarman & Harry G. Levine,
eds., 1997) (discussing the surge in media coverage of "crack" in 1986).
37. E.g., John J. Goldman, New York City Being Swamped by "Crack"; Authorities Say
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House of Representatives held hearings on the perceived crisis."
At these hearings, it was asserted that crack: (1) was more addic-
tive than powder cocaine," (2) produced physiological effects that
were different from and worse than those caused by powder co-
They Are Almost Powerless to Halt Cocaine, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1986, at Al; Steven K.
Johnson, 'Crack'Puts New Pop in Cocaine Market, CHI. TRIB., May 21, 1986, at Cl; Peter
Kerr, Crack Addiction Spreads Among the Middle Class, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 1986, at Al;
Peter Kerr, Drug Treatment in City Is Strained by Crack, a Potent New Cocaine, N.Y.
TIMES, May 16, 1986, at Al; Peter Kerr, Extra-Potent Cocaine: Use Rising Sharply Among
Teen-Agers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1986, at Bi ("In dramatically rising numbers in the last
five months, teen-agers in New York City and its suburbs have been using 'crack,' an espe-
cially potent and addicting form of cocaine."); R.H. Melton & Linda Wheeler, Once for
Elite, Cocaine Now an Equal-Opportunity Vice; Bias' Death Puts Focus on Growing Threat,
WASH. POST, June 22, 1986, at Al ('The illegal use of cocaine has reached record levels
throughout the Washington area, posing a virtually insurmountable challenge to police
departments."); Tom Morganthau et al., Crack and Crime, NEWSWEEK, June 16, 1986, at
16, 16 ("Crack-smokeable cocaine-has suddenly become America's fastest-growing drug
epidemic and potentially its most serious."); Michele L. Norris, Hard Rock: Crystallized
Cocaine, the Poor Man's High, Grips Richer, Growing Clientele, L.A. TIMES, June 22, 1986,
at SB1 ("Rock cocaine, once considered a low-income high, has moved out of the Los An-
geles ghettos and into the South Bay."); Dody Tsiantar, Crack Making Violent Presence
Felt in New York; Cheap, Highly Addictive Form of Cocaine Is Spreading in Major Cities,
Authorities Say, WASH. POST, June 13, 1986, at A3 ("Virtually unheard of nine months ago
on the East Coast, crack has swept affluent and poor neighborhoods alike, tempting child-
ren as young as 8 years old."). Three prominent wire services (Scripps-Howard, Associated
Press, and United Press International) all distributed stories over a two-week period be-
ginning in late May 2006 that discussed the crack "epidemic." See 'Crack' Called Nation's
Drug Epidemic, SUNDAY INTELLIGENCER (Doylestown, Pa.), June 8, 1986, at A6 ("They call
it 'crack' on the East Coast and 'rock' out West. Whatever its name, this refined, smoke a-
ble form of cocaine may be the most addictive narcotic ever sold on the streets of Ameri-
ca."); Crack: It's a New, Popular and Dangerous Cocaine Substitute, PHAROS-TRIB. (Lo-
gansport, Ind.), May 30, 1986, at 11 ("Crack, a cheap new smokeable form of cocaine, is
highly addictive, extremely harmful and is rapidly becoming the 'fast-food' alternative to
regular cocaine."); More People Take Crack at Crack, SALINA JOURNAL (Salina, Kan.), June
13, 1986, at 18 (noting that crack, "obscure" eight months earlier, is now "an epidemic").
Two commentators have described the onslaught of press coverage of the nation's drug
problem the "Media Epidemic of 1986." James D. Orcutt & J. Blake Turner, Shocking
Numbers and Graphic Accounts: Quantified Images of Drug Problems in the Print Media,
in DRUGS, ALCOHOL AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS 35, 35 (James D. Orcutt & David R. Rudy, eds.
2003).
38. See 1986 Senate Hearing, supra note 4; The Crack Cocaine Crisis: J Hearing Be-
fore the H. Select Comm. on Narcotics Abuse and Control and the H. Select Comm. on
Children, Youth, and Families, 99th Cong. (1987).
39. 1986 Senate Hearing, supra note 4, at 8 (statement of Sen. Chiles) ("We are all
familiar with cocaine; it has been with us for a long time. Crack, however, is something
altogether different. It is far more powerful, far cheaper, far more addictive, and increa-
singly available."); id. at 59 (testimony of James Adams, Sheriff, Sumter County, Fla.)
("[W]e do know that cocaine is a highly addictive drug, and rock cocaine seems to produce
an even more addictive effect."); id. at 87-88 (statement of Robert Byck, Professor of Psy-
chiatry and Pharmacology, Yale University School of Medicine) ("A very high percentage of
'crack' users become addicted to the use of the drug. Some experts estimate a fifty times
greater risk of addiction than with snorted intranasal cocaine hydrochloride.").
[Vol. 45:765772
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caine,40 (3) attracted users who could not afford powder cocaine,
especially young people,' and (4) led to more crime than powder
cocaine did.42
To paraphrase an old proverb, if the closest tool is a hammer,
every problem starts to look like a nail. 3 Because the creation of
new criminal sanctions is one of Congress's core competencies, 44it
was predictable that the federal legislature would respond to the
nation's drug problem generally, and the crack crisis specifically,
by ramping up the penalties attached to drug crimes-especially
those involving cocaine base, a substance understood as being es-
sentially congruent with crack.45 Prior to 1986, federal sentencing
40. Id. at 2 (statement of Sen. Roth) ("Instead of being satisfied with one or two
snorts, as is the case in traditional cocaine users, crack users demand multiple hits imme-
diately to offset the physical and psychological depression they experience each time they
crash.').
41. Id. at 15 (testimony of Charles R. Schuster, Director, National Institute on Drug
Abuse) (observing that crack "sells for a lower unit price [than cocaine], which attracts
younger and less affluent street customers" and that the low cost of crack "is very impor-
tant since it reduces the price barrier that prohibited young children from being able to
purchase the drug in the past."); 132 CONG. REc. S14,295 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1986) (re-
marks of Sen. Leahy) ("Drug merchants are now pushing a new craze that is sweeping the
Nation. Crack is available to the young, and it will be in the schools this fall. I have heard
stories of children as young as nine who are already crack users. The sellers also use these
children as lookouts and as workers in houses that manufacture crack. One hit costs just
$10. Users say addiction can begin after only the second use of crack.").
42. 1986 Senate Hearing, supra note 4, at 6 (statement of Sen. Nunn) ("Dealers in the
more conventional form of cocaine-the so-called 'white powder' variety-generally do not
barter their cocaine for stolen goods. But reportedly, because of the relatively low price of
this form of cocaine, crack dealers do accept stolen property as payment.. . . Police are an-
ticipating an increase in burglaries and similar violations as crack use spreads."); see also
132 CONG. REC. 22,991 (1986) (remarks of Rep. Dorgan) ("Police report that increased
crack use has also engendered increased crime in several cities. Users become so deranged
from its psychotic effects that they may perpetrate brutal crimes.").
43. In fairness, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 also allocated funds for drug re-
search, education, treatment, and prevention efforts by law enforcement. See Anti-Drug
Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207; see also Beaver, supra note 7, at
2548 (citing 132 CONG. REC. 26,451-52, 26,460 (1986)) (discussing various congressional
earmarks for treatment, education, research, and prevention).
44. See generally HARVEY A. SILVERGLATE, THREE FELONIES A DAY: HOW THE FEDS
TARGET THE INNOCENT (2009) (discussing the expansion of the federal criminal law); Wil-
liam J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 523-39
(2001) (discussing the forces that cause legislatures to expand criminal sanctions).
45. There exists a lively debate over whether "cocaine base," as used in the statute, is
limited to crack cocaine, or includes other forms of cocaine base. See United States v. Hig-
gins, 557 F.3d 381, 394-95 (6th Cir. 2009) (discussing the split of authority on this sub-
ject); Andrew King, The Meaning of the Term "Cocaine Base" in 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1): A Cir-
cuit Split over Statutory Interpretation, 48 DuQ. L. REV. 105 (2010) (same). The issue is
presently before the Supreme Court of the United States. See DiPierre v. United States,
No. 09-1533 (argued Feb. 28, 2011). The term "cocaine base" as used within the Guidelines
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law did not distinguish between the powder and crack forms of
cocaine.46 In assigning mandatory minimum prison sentences to
defendants involved in the distribution of certain illegal drugs,47
however, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 drew a clear distinc-
tion between the two types of cocaine, treating crack as by far the
greater evil.48 Congress tied these sentences to the amount, in
weight, of the particular drug involved.49 The Act predicated a
five-year mandatory minimum sentence on a defendant's in-
volvement with at least five hundred grams of powder cocaine
(i.e., more than a pound of the substance).5o A mere five grams of
cocaine base (about the weight of a nickel) implicated this same
minimum term. 1 Meanwhile, the Act's ten-year mandatory min-
imum sentence was reserved for persons convicted of trafficking
crimes involving at least five kilograms of powder cocaine-or
just fifty grams of cocaine base.52 Overall, this disparity meant
that street dealers of crack would be treated the same as large-
scale cocaine distributors for sentencing purposes, while low-level
dealers of powder cocaine usually would escape any mandatory
minimum term.
Though the history and terms of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of
1986 are interesting for a number of reasons, a few points seem
particularly relevant to the later reconsideration of the Act's pe-
nalty provisions. First, Congress essentially pulled the low quan-
tity thresholds applicable to crack cocaine out of thin air63 in its
(as opposed to the statute) is more clearly defined. In 1993, an amendment to the Guide-
lines adopted a narrow definition of cocaine base that equates cocaine base with crack.
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C (2010); see also United States v. Person,
377 F. Supp. 2d 308, 309-10 (D. Mass. 2005) (discussing the amendment).
46. Compare 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1) (1982) (providing no distinct penalties for posses-
sion of cocaine base), with Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1002, 100 Stat. 3207, 3207-2 (1986)
(amending 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) to include express quantity thresholds for trafficking crimes
involving cocaine base).
47. The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 was not the first federal law to impose mandato-
ry minimum sentences for drug crimes, but it did fill a void in the law at the time of its
enactment. The earlier minimum terms were established by Pub. L. No. 82-255, 65 Stat.
767 (1951), and then amended by the Narcotic Control Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-728, 70
Stat. 567; however, these statutory minimums were largely repealed by the Comprehen-
sive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, § 1101, 84 Stat.
1236, 1291-92. For additional discussion of this history, see Sklansky, supra note 7, at
1286 n.13.
48. See Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1002(1)(A)-(B), 100 Stat. 3207, 3207-2 to 3207-3 (1986).
49. Id.
50. Id. § 1002(1)(B), 100 Stat. at 3207-3.
51. Id.
52. Id. § 1002(1)(A), 100 Stat. at 3207-2.
53. See 1995 USSC COCAINE REPORT, supra note 22, at 117 ("[The legislative history
[Vol. 45:765774
FAIR SENTENCING ACT OF 2010
rush to pass significant anti-drug legislation before the November
1986 elections.5 4 No testimony or other evidence placed before
Congress clearly pointed toward the chosen quantities as triggers
for mandatory minimum terms, as opposed to somewhat greater
amounts that would still reflect the presumably substantial perils
associated with crack cocaine.
Second, most members of Congress were not especially con-
cerned with calibrating an appropriate "ratio" between the quan-
tity thresholds that would apply to powder and crack cocaine. At
most, there existed an inchoate sense that crack implicated dif-
ferent and greater dangers than powder cocaine, and that crimes
involving crack should be punished accordingly. Ultimately, Sen-
ators and Representatives became preoccupied with driving up
the penalties attached to crack,65 with the punishment for crimes
involving powder cocaine (and other controlled substances ad-
dressed by the Act) representing a relative afterthought. Wide-
spread recognition of a powder-crack "ratio" would come only
much later.
Third, the 100:1 powder-to-crack quantity disparity adopted by
Congress represented an outlier among legislative responses to
the crack cocaine "epidemic." Like their federal counterparts,
state legislators faced substantial pressure to respond to the
spike in drug trafficking and abuse perceived to be occurring in
the mid-to-late 1980s. Some states responded by stiffening the
penalties attached to drug crimes, including offenses involving
crack cocaine. Yet to the extent that these states tied these penal-
ties to the amount, in weight, of the given drug involved, only two
states even partially adopted the 100:1 powder-to-crack cocaine
disparity chosen by Congress, and no state endorsed an even
[of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986] does not include any discussion of the 100-to-1 powd-
er cocaine/crack cocaine quantity ratio per se."); Sklansky, supra note 7, at 1297 (noting
the lack of explanation for the quantities chosen by Congress). Representative Dan Lung-
ren of California candidly acknowledged as much during the floor debate over the Fair
Sentencing Act. Lungren, who was involved in drafting the 1986 law, noted, "We initially
came out of committee with a 20-to-1 ratio. By the time we finished on the floor, it was
100-to-1. We didn't really have an evidentiary basis for it, but that's what we did, thinking
we were doing the right thing at the time." 156 CONG. REC. H6202 (daily ed. July 28, 2010)
(remarks of Rep. Lungren).
54. See Sklansky, supra note 7, at 1294 & n.55 (discussing the push for stiffer drug
penalties in light of looming congressional elections); Jonathan Fuerbringer, House Ap-
proves Use of Military to Fight Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 1986, at Al (same).
55. See Sklansky, supra note 7, at 1296 (describing congressional action as a sort of
"partisan bidding war over the penalties for crack trafficking").
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greater discrepancy.56 Maryland, for example, considered a 44.8:1
powder-to-crack ratio for sentencing purposes, but cooler heads
prevailed, and the legislature ultimately endorsed a ratio of just
less than 9:1.57 Minnesota adopted a 10:3 powder-to-crack ratio.58
Most states declined to revisit their sentencing laws at all, such
that the powder-to-crack ratio in these states effectively stood at
1:1 .'
Fourth, the creation of the federal mandatory minimums
prompted the wholesale adoption of a 100:1 powder-to-crack
quantity discrepancy throughout the Guidelines, then under de-
velopment. Though the 1986 Act mandated five- or ten-year min-
imum sentences for defendants involved with certain amounts of
powder or crack cocaine, this law said nothing about the sen-
tences to be imposed upon defendants who were involved with
amounts less than those necessary to trigger a mandatory mini-
mum. 60 Nor did the Act relate the precise sentences, above and
beyond the relevant mandatory minimum, courts should issue to
defendants involved with quantities significantly greater than
those necessary to implicate the ten-year minimum sentence, or
quantities that were more than the amount necessary to impli-
cate the five-year minimum term but less than those necessary to
trigger the ten-year mandatory sentence.6 1 In drafting the Guide-
lines, the Commission filled in these gaps by using the quantities
and minimum terms prescribed by the 1986 Act as baselines. 62
56. See 2007 USSC COCAINE REPORT, supra note 22, at 98-99 (noting that only thir-
teen states draw a distinction between powder and crack cocaine in their penalty
schemes); Sacher, supra note 7, at 1170 app. A (reporting that only Iowa and North Dako-
ta had adopted a 100:1 powder-to-cocaine ratio); Bill Rankin, U.S. Crack Laws Tip Scales
Against Blacks, Statistics Show, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Feb. 11, 1993, at Al (explaining
that most states do not distinguish between crack and powder cocaine when sentencing
criminal defendants convicted of drug crimes).
57. 1990 Md. Laws 1187 (repealed by 2002 Md. Laws 26).
58. 1987 Minn. Laws 1951, 1952 (repealed by 1989 Minn. Laws 1612).
59. See 2007 USSC COCAINE REPORT, supra note 22, at 130 (noting that thirty-seven
states have a 1:1 ratio); 1995 USSC COCAINE REPORT, supra note 22, at 98 (noting that
thirty-six states have a 1:1 ratio).
60. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1302, 100 Stat. 3207, 3207-
16 to 3207-17 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (2006)).
61. See id.
62. 1995 USSC COCAINE REPORT, supra note 22, at 1. As originally promulgated, the
Guidelines created sixteen different base offense levels. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 2D1.1 (1987). The three lowest levels were reserved for drugs other than co-
caine. Id. The other thirteen levels all prescribed sentencing ranges for trafficking crimes
involving specific quantities of powder cocaine or cocaine base:
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For first offenders, the smallest quantity of crack or powder co-
caine necessary to implicate a given mandatory term was as-
signed a Guidelines base offense level corresponding to a sentenc-
ing range that hovered just above that minimum sentence.13
These pairings then served as benchmarks for the first-offender
sentencing ranges assigned to offenses involving greater or lesser
quantities of powder or crack cocaine. Quantities slightly less
than the amounts necessary to implicate the mandatory mini-
Amount of Powder Cocaine Amount of Cocaine Base Of- Guidelines Range
Base fense Level (No Prior Crimi-
nal History)
50 kilograms or more 500 grams or more 36 188-235 months
15-49.9 kilograms 150-499 grams 34 151-188 months
5-14.9 kilograms 50-149 grams 32 121-151 months
3.5-4.9 kilograms 35-49 grams 30 97-121 months
2-3.4 kilograms 20-34.9 grams 28 78-97 months
.5-1.9 kilograms 5-19 grams 26 63-78 months
400-499 grams 4-4.9 grams 24 51-63 months
300-399 grams 3-3.9 grams 22 41-51 months
200-299 grams 2-2.9 grams 20 33-41 months
100-199 grams 1-1.9 grams 18 27-33 months
50-99 grams 500-999 milligrams 16 21-27 months
25-49 grams 250-499 milligrams 14 15-21 months
<25 grams <250 milligrams 12 10-16 months
Id. §§ 2D1.1, 5A. The Commission's avoidance of steep sentencing "cliffs" led to the per-
petuation of the 100:1 ratio across all federal cocaine trafficking convictions, regardless of
the quantities involved. For example, as the table reflects, the Guidelines initially recom-
mended a sentence between eight years, one month and ten years, one month for a defen-
dant convicted of a crime involving 4.9 kilograms of powder cocaine or 49 grams of crack-
well in excess of the five-year mandatory minimum sentence prescribed by the 1986 Act
for crimes involving these quantities, but close to the ten-year mandatory minimum sen-
tence mandated for convictions involving just slightly greater quantities of these forms of
cocaine (as to which a sentencing range of ten years, one month to twelve years, seven
months adhered). See id.
63. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 2D1.1, 5A (1987) (prescribing a low-
end sentence of five years, three months for possession of five grams of cocaine base and a
low-end sentence of ten years, one month for possession of fifty grams of cocaine).
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mums were assigned sentencing ranges with floors slightly lower
than the mandatory minimum terms, and so forth.64
Fifth and finally, at their inception, the stiff penalties attached
to crack cocaine did not carry the same political valence that they
later acquired. The core of what would become the Anti-Drug
Abuse Act of 1986 sailed through the House of Representatives by
a 392-16 vote; in the key Senate vote, the tally was 97-2.65 A ma-
jority of the members of the Congressional Black Caucus voted for
the measure.66 The handful of opponents included some of the
most progressive members of Congress, who were concerned
about the Act's sweeping terms (which went well beyond the
adoption of mandatory minimum sentences).67 In the atmosphere
of that time, however, many liberals put aside any doubts that
they may have held about the legislation, held their noses, and
voted "aye."
64. As originally promulgated, the comments to the relevant Guidelines provision
provided, in relevant part, as follows:
The base offense levels in § 2D1.1 are either provided directly by the Anti-
Drug Abuse Act of 1986 or are proportional to the levels established by sta-
tute, and apply to all unlawful trafficking. Levels 32 and 26 in the Drug
Quantity Table are the distinctions provided by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act;
however, further refinement of drug amounts is essential to provide a logical
sentencing structure for drug offenses. To determine these finer distinctions,
the Commission consulted numerous experts and practitioners, including au-
thorities at the Drug Enforcement Administration, chemists, attorneys, pro-
bation officers, and members of the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task
Forces, who also advocate the necessity of these distinctions. The base offense
levels [at levels 26 and 32] represent mandatory minimum sentences estab-
lished by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986. These levels reflect sentences
with a lower limit as close to the statutory requirement as possible; e.g., level
32 ranges from 121 to 151 months, where the statutory minimum is ten years
or 120 months.
Id. § 2D1.1 cmt.
65. 1986 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 98-H to 99-H; 1986 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 50-S.
66. Cracked Justice-Addressing the Unfairness in Cocaine Sentencing: Hearing be-
fore the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 110th Cong. 3 (2008) [hereinafter Cracked Justice Hearing] (statement of Rep.
Gohmert).
67. See, e.g., 132 CONG. REC. 23,001-02 (1986) (remarks of Rep. Weiss). The Repre-
sentatives who voted against the Act were: Dellums (D-CA), Edwards (D-CA), Roybal (D-
CA), Savage (D-IL), Crane (R-LL), Mitchell (D-MD), Frank (D-MA), Conyers (D-MI),
Crockett (D-MI), Sabo (D-MN), Clay (D-MO), Weiss (D-NY), Stokes (D-OH), Weaver (D-
OR), Gonzales (D-TX), and Lowry (D-WA). 1986 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 98-H to 99-H.
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III. RECONSIDERATION
Representative Charles Rangel of New York was among the
members of Congress who voted for the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of
1986.68 Rangel also (grudgingly) voted for an omnibus 1988 law
that imposed mandatory minimum prison terms on individuals
convicted of mere possession of five grams or more of crack co-
caine.69 Just five years after the second of these votes, Rangel
dropped House Bill 3277, the Crack-Cocaine Equitable Sentenc-
ing Act of 1993, into the hopper.70 This measure would have elim-
inated the distinction between crack and powder cocaine for sen-
tencing purposes, with both forms of the drug henceforth being
governed by the sentencing rules that previously applied only to
powder cocaine?
What changed over the intervening five years to produce such a
reversal? For one thing, little evidence appeared over this span to
confirm that crack cocaine was as great a threat to the general
public welfare as many had feared just a few years earlier. On the
contrary, use of crack appeared to decline. 72 In 1993, a Washing-
ton Post staff writer named Malcolm Gladwell observed that the
crack business was "not the monster it used to be."7 3 Explaining a
perceived drop in crack usage in New York, he continued, "In a
pattern that experts said is being repeated nationwide, teenagers
coming of age in New York's most drug-ridden neighborhoods
have seen the damage crack has done and apparently are turning
68. 1986 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 98-H to 99-H.
69. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 6371, 102 Stat. 4181, 4370.
The key House of Representatives votes on the measure, H.R. 5210, 101st Cong. (1988),
were 375-30 and 346-11 in favor of the bill. 1988 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 102-H, 138-H. This
provision represented "the only federal mandatory minimum for a first offense of simple
possession of a controlled substance. . . . [Slimple possession of any quantity of any other
substance-including powder cocaine-by first-time offenders is a misdemeanor offense
punishable by no more than one year in prison." 1995 USSC COCAINE REPORT, supra note
22, at 2.
70. Crack-Cocaine Equitable Sentencing Act of 1993, H.R. 3277, 103d Cong. (1993).
71. See id.
72. See Richard L. Berke, Student Survey Detects Decline in Use of Crack, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 1, 1989, at A16; Rick DelVecchio, Bay Area Crack Baby Epidemic Declines, S.F.
CHRON., June 3, 1991, at A13; Matt Neufeld & Enrique J. Gonzalez, Police Report Drop in
Crack Use in District, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 5, 1991, at Bl; Joseph B. Treaster, New York
State Reports a Drop in Crack Traffic, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 1990, at B5.
73. Malcolm Gladwell, N.Y Crack Epidemic Appears to Wane, WASH. POST, May 31,
1993, at Al.
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against it."74 The stagnation of the erstwhile "epidemic" led some
to rethink whether the drug was as addictive as previously
thought.7 5 In 1986, Newsweek, quoting a drug expert, reported
that "'[c]rack is the most addictive drug known to man."'76 Less
than four years later, the same magazine explained, "[Als with
most other drugs, a lot of people use [crack] without getting ad-
dicted."77 Meanwhile, other commentators started to question the
supposedly close connection between crack and violent crime.7 1
Given these developments, a growing number of observers
came to believe that crack was not a new drug that involved un-
precedented threats to public safety and health, but merely a
form of cocaine that, due to its manner of ingestion, produced a
rush that was more intense but shorter-lived than that created by
the inhalation of cocaine powder. This appreciation of the similar-
ities between powder and crack cocaine-instead of a single-
minded focus on the allegedly unique perils associated with
crack-naturally led to a juxtaposition of the federal penalty pro-
visions applicable to the different forms of cocaine. This compari-
son came to be framed in terms of a powder-to-crack "ratio."
The crack trade did not decline so significantly as to dry up the
flow of defendants into federal court. 9 It did, however, contribute
to a shift in media and popular attention from current and poten-
tial crack users-whose plight no longer seemed quite so preva-
lent or desperate-to the sentences that were being imposed on
individuals prosecuted for making or selling crack.80 To many, it
74. Id. Use of powder and crack cocaine continued to decline in the years that fol-
lowed, from 5.8 million users in 1985 to 1.7 million users in 2006. DEA REPORT, supra note
34, at 59-60; OFFICE OF NAT'L DRUG USE POLICY, THE STATE OF DRUG USE IN AMERICA
(2007), http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/dfc/files/nsdun.pdf.
75. Reinarman & Levine, supra note 36, at 24 ("By the beginning of 1992 ... the War
on Drugs in general, and the crack scare in particular, had begun to decline significantly
in prominence and importance.").
76. Tom Morganthau et al., Kids and Cocaine, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 17, 1986, at 58.
77. Larry Martz, A Dirty Drug Secret: Hyping Instant Addiction Doesn't Help,
NEWSWEEK, Feb. 19, 1990, at 74. Conflicting reports also appeared about the addictive
properties of crack, relative to powder cocaine. Compare Jeffrey Fagin & Ko-Lin Chen, In-
itiation into Crack and Cocaine: A Tale of Two Epidemics, 16 CONTEMP. DRUG PROBLEMS
579 (1989), with Pamela S. Zurer, Scientists Struggling to Understand and Treat Cocaine
Dependency, CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING NEWS, Nov. 21, 1988, at 9 ("People often snorted
cocaine for a year or two before they got in trouble with it, whereas people smoking crack
can get into trouble within a matter of a few weeks or months." (quoting a researcher)).
78. E.g., Fagin & Chin, supra note 77, at 605-06.
79. See 2007 USSC COCAINE REPORT, supra note 22, at 12 & fig.2-1 (charting the
number of federal "crack" prosecutions between 1992 and 2006).
80. E.g., Dennis Cauchon, Balanced Justice?, USA TODAY, May 26, 1993, at 1A (ex-
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was impossible to justify the 100:1 powder-crack disparity that
had been codified back in 1986, or the lengthy prison sentences
that individuals convicted of selling small amounts of crack were
receiving in federal court.
Even so, the predicament of defendants convicted of trafficking
in crack might not have attracted significant attention, but for
the fact that most of these individuals were African-American,
whereas most defendants charged with crimes involving powder
cocaine were Caucasian or Latino.8 1 This disparity raised con-
cerns82 that the 100:1 ratio was "discriminatory in operation" and
merited reconsideration on this basis.s' The Commission summa-
rized sentiments on this score in a report it produced a few years
after the backlash to the 100:1 ratio first emerged:
When one form of a drug can be rather easily converted to another
form of the same drug and when that second form is punished at a
quantity ratio 100 times greater than the original form, it would ap-
pear reasonable to require the existence of sufficient policy bases to
support such a sentencing scheme regardless of racial impact. More-
over, when such an enhanced ratio for a particular form of a drug
has a disproportionate effect on one segment of the population, it is
particularly important that sufficient policy bases exist in support of
the enhanced ratio.8"
amining disparities in sentences for crimes involving crack cocaine and crimes involving
powder cocaine); Jim Newton, Crack Cocaine Laws Unfairly Penalize Blacks, Critics Say,
OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Dec. 4, 1992, at 10 (examining the difference between the pu-
nishments for crimes involving powder cocaine and the punishments for crimes involving
crack cocaine).
81. See, e.g., Val Ellicott, Crack Crackdown Singles out Blacks, Lawyers Say, PALM
BEACH POST (Fla.), May 10, 1992, at 1A ("[The federal 100:1 ratio] didn't attract wide-
spread critical attention until about a year ago, when defense attorneys noticed that al-
most all their crack clients had something in common: They were black."); Newton, supra
note 80, at 10 (observing that concerns about the 100:1 ratio "are shared by a growing cho-
rus of legal scholars and defense lawyers"); see also Sklansky, supra note 7, at 1289 (dis-
cussing the racial dimensions of the powder cocaine-crack divide).
82. See, e.g., Cocaine Sentences Discriminate Against Blacks, Activists Say, S.F.
CHRON., Aug. 26, 1993, at A2 (discussing the objections raised by some civil-rights activ-
ists to mandatory minimum sentences for crack offenses); Sonya Ross, Activists Say U.S.
Drug Law on Sentencing Targets Blacks, Wis. ST. J. (Madison), Aug. 26, 1993, at 3A
(same).
83. Op-Ed., Same Drug, Different Penalties, WASH. POST, Aug. 4, 1993, at A16; see
Cauchon, supra note 80, at 1A ("Any law that distinguishes between crack cocaine and
powder cocaine is designed to discriminate." (quoting Rev. Joseph E. Lowery, President of
the Southern Christian Leadership Conference)); Rankin, supra note 56, at 1 (quoting the
Rev. Joseph E. Lowery, President of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, as
attacking the powder-crack ratio).
84. 1995 USSC COCAINE REPORT, supra note 22, at xii.
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Defense attorneys also perceived invidious discrimination in
the different sentencing rules applicable to powder and crack co-
caine, with their arguments commonly being couched in Equal
Protection terms.@9 These views gained traction with a few courts,
but just a few.86 In State u. Russell, decided in 1991, the Minneso-
ta Supreme Court held that the state's 10:3 powder-to-crack ratio
failed for want of a rational basis behind the distinction.87 In so
holding, the Russell court evinced a skepticism toward heigh-
tened penalties for crack that would have been unheard of just a
few years earlier.8 In a footnote, the majority opinion in Russell
also commented on the significance of how the different penalties
for crimes involving powder cocaine on the one hand, and crack
cocaine on the other, tended to apply to distinct cohorts of defen-
dants: "While we are ordinarily loathe to intrude or even inquire
into the legislative process on matters of criminal punishment,
the correlation between race and the use of cocaine base or powd-
er and the gross disparity in resulting punishment cries out for
closer scrutiny of the challenged laws.""9 The two concurring opi-
nions in Russell likewise stressed that virtually all of the defen-
dants being sentenced for crack offenses in Minnesota were Afri-
can-American.9o
While it drew attention to the possibility that powder-crack
sentencing discrepancies might not rest on compelling evidence,91
85. See Harriet Chiang, Drug Lawyers Say Anti-Crack Law Is Anti-Black, S.F.
CHRON., Sept. 15, 1988, at A7 (reporting a courthouse challenge to California state laws
that assigned a higher maximum sentence to defendants convicted of selling crack cocaine
than that applicable to defendants convicted of selling powder cocaine).
86. In the rare instances in which federal district courts granted downward depar-
tures from the applicable Guidelines range due to concerns about the disparate impact of
the sentencing laws applicable to crack cocaine, they were reversed on appeal. E.g., United
States v. Alton, 60 F.3d 1065, 1071 (3d Cir. 1995); United States v. Maxwell, 25 F.3d 1389,
1400-01 (8th Cir. 1994), remanded, 90 F.3d 302 (8th Cir. 1996). Other judges expressed
sympathy for defendants' attacks on the federal sentencing laws, even as they applied
them. For example, one federal judge described a sentence he was about to impose as "one
of the unfairest" he had ever given, but felt obliged to adhere to the "awful" mandatory
minimum term that governed the case. Cauchon, supra note 80, at 1A (describing this col-
loquy).
87. 477 N.W.2d 886, 888, 891 (Minn. 1991).
88. Id. at 889-91.
89. Id. at 888 n.2.
90. Id. at 892 (Yetka, J, concurring); id. at 893-95 (Simonett, J., concurring).
91. See Robb London, Judge's Overruling of Crack Law Brings Turmoil, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 11, 1991, at B5 (discussing a dearth of scientific studies supporting the notion that
crack is more powerful or addictive than powder cocaine).
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the Russell decision was, and remains, an outlier.92 The vast ma-
jority of courts have declined defendants' invitations to strike
down stiff mandatory minimum sentences applied to crimes in-
volving relatively small amounts of crack." This result has held
regardless of the line of attack pursued by a given defendant.
Courts typically dispose of the most common challenge, sounding
in Equal Protection, by first concluding that the powder-crack
distinction implicates neither a suspect classification nor a fun-
damental right; and then finding that the legislature had before
it (or might have recognized) adequate grounds to distinguish be-
tween crack and powder cocaine.94 That the arguments in favor of
this distinction might not be quite as persuasive as originally es-
timated, courts have determined, did not mean that legislators
lacked a rational basis for treating crack as a greater threat, and
thus worthy of greater sanctions, than powder cocaine.
By 1993, it was evident that any change in the 100:1 federal
powder-to-crack ratio5 would have to come from Congress.
Around this time, there was some sign of movement at the federal
level: Attorney General Janet Reno expressed concern about the
discrepancy,96 a member of the Commission said that he found the
disparity "troubling,"97 and in November 1993, the Commission
held a hearing that probed the rationales for the heightened pu-
nishments attached to crack crimes.9" Yet there existed little en-
thusiasm among most members of Congress to revisit penalties so
92. The Russell decision generated significant criticism at the time. See, e.g., George
Will, Crack vs. Powder Ruling Cracked, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Dec. 22, 1991, at
F2 (criticizing the Russell decision).
93. See generally THOMAS W. HUTCHISON ET AL., FEDERAL SENTENCING LAW AND
PRACTICE 458 & n.227 (2009) (listing decisions rejecting challenges to the powder-crack
ratio).
94. E.g., United States v. Harding, 971 F.2d 410, 413-14 (9th Cir. 1992); United
States v. Lawrence, 951 F.2d 751, 755 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v. House, 939 F.2d
659, 664 (8th Cir. 1991); United States v. Avant, 907 F.2d 623, 626-27 (6th Cir. 1990);
United States v. Cyrus, 890 F.2d 1245, 1248 (D.C. Cir. 1989); United States v. Solomon,
848 F.2d 156, 157 (11th Cir. 1988).
95. Other jurisdictions faced similar decisions. In 1993, Wisconsin addressed the dis-
parate treatment of powder cocaine and crack under state law by simultaneously decreas-
ing the penalties attached to crimes involving crack and increasing the penalties affixed to
trafficking in powder cocaine. 1993 Wis. Sess. Laws 640, 653-55; see also David Doege,
New Law Eases Penalties for State's Crack Dealers, MILWAUKEE SENTINEL, Dec. 25, 1993,
at Al (discussing the reasons for the revision).
96. Cauchon, supra note 80.
97. Id. (quoting Commissioner David Mazzone).
98. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, HEARING ON CRACK COCAINE 9 (Nov. 9, 1993).
20111 783
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
recently enacted into law. Congressman Rangel's bill ultimately
died in committee, as did other, similar proposals.99 The Commis-
sion issued an amendment to the Guidelines in 1995 that would
have eliminated the categorically disparate treatment of powder
and crack; however, Congress rejected the suggestion by a con-
vincing margin (the vote in the House of Representatives was
332-83).1oo When President Clinton signed the measure disap-
proving the amendment, he observed, "We have to send a con-
stant message to our children that drugs are illegal, drugs are
dangerous, drugs may cost you your life-and the penalties for
dealing drugs are severe."101 Clinton added that he was "not going
to let anyone who peddles drugs get the idea that the cost of doing
business is going down."102
Perhaps it was too soon to reduce the penalties attached to
crack. Yet there existed another route toward shrinking the 100:1
ratio: increasing the penalties attached to powder cocaine, while
leaving those attached to crack untouched. Some members of
Congress who disagreed with the 100:1 ratio supported this ap-
proach.103 Proposals to this effect failed to gain traction, however,
because by the late 1990s Congress had turned its legislative
energies to a different drug: methamphetamine.104
99. See H.R. 697, 107th Cong. (2001).
100. See Spade, supra note 7, at 1275; 1995 CONG. Q. ALMANAC H-208 to H-209.
101. 145 CONG. REC. 887 (1999) (statement of William J. Clinton, President of the
United States).
102. Id.
103. 141 CONG. REC. 27,203 (1995) (remarks of Sen. Abraham) (agreeing that the diffe-
rential may not represent the "best policy," but arguing that the best remedy would be to
decrease the amounts of powder cocaine required to implicate the mandatory minimums);
see also H.R. REP. No. 104-272, at 4 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 335, 337
("While the evidence clearly indicates that there are significant distinctions between crack
and powder cocaine that warrant maintaining longer sentences for crack-related offenses,
it should be noted that the current 100-to-1 quantity ratio may not be the appropriate ra-
tio."); Rankin, supra note 56 ('"It's no coincidence we tried to put a harsher sentence on
crack. It's important to remember that an awful lot of the victims of crack cocaine are in
the black community . . . . We may just need to increase the other sentences."' (quoting
Sen. Nunn)). For examples of bills that would have adopted this approach, see Powder Co-
caine Sentencing Act of 1999, S. 146, 106th Cong. (1999) (increasing penalties for powder
cocaine); Get Tough on Cocaine Act of 1997, H.R. 2229, 105th Cong. (1997) (same); S. 1398,
104th Cong. (1995) (increasing the penalties for trafficking powder cocaine).
104. See, e.g., Deborah Ahrens, Methademic: Drug Panic in an Age of Ambivalence, 37
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 841, 867 (2010); Note, Cooking up Solutions to a Cooked up Menace:
Responses to Methamphetamine in a Federal System, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2508, 2509-12
(2006).
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Fears of a methamphetamine "epidemic" waxed as concerns
about a crack cocaine "epidemic" waned. A 1998 report prepared
by the House of Representatives Judiciary Committee warned,
"Methamphetamine is no longer a problem confined to California
and the Southwest, but has spread east, devastating some com-
munities much like cocaine did in the 1980s."1o5 In the years that
followed, Congress issued several more reports announcing a me-
thamphetamine "epidemic."06 One intoned, "Of the many drug
threats facing our Nation, few can compare in their growth or de-
structiveness to methamphetamine abuse."o7 Another advised
that methamphetamine "is among the most powerful and danger-
ous drugs available"os and "[t]he methamphetamine problem has
grown at a dramatic rate, and is now considered the most signifi-
cant drug abuse problem in the country."109 Instead of fretting
about "crack babies" and the violent crime linked to crack distri-
bution and abuse, these reports dwelled on the environmental
hazards created by methamphetamine labs and the neglect of
children trapped in households afflicted by methamphetamine
use."0 As some members of the media observed, by the mid-2000s
the concerns voiced about methamphetamine echoed the fears re-
garding crack that had been expressed back in the 1980s.111
105. REP. MCCOLLUM, SPEED TRAFFICKING LIFE IN PRISON ACT OF 1998, H.R. REP. No.
105-711, pt. 1, at 2 (1998).
106. REP. DAVIS, THE METHAMPHETAMINE EPIDEMIC: INTERNATIONAL ROOTS OF THE
PROBLEM, AND RECOMMENDED SOLUTIONS, H.R. REP. No. 109-352 (2005) ("The Metham-
phetamine Epidemic: International Roots of the Problem, and Recommended Solutions");
REP. SENSENBRENNER, METHAMPHETAMINE EPIDEMIC ELIMINATION ACT, H.R. REP. No.
109-299, pt. 1 (2005) ('Methamphetamine Epidemic Elimination Act"); REP. MCCOLLUM,
METHAMPHETAMINE AND CLUB DRUG ANTI-PROLIFERATION ACT OF 2000, H.R. REP. No.
106-878, at 22 (2000) ("The methamphetamine epidemic in America differs in kind from
the threat of other illegal drugs because methamphetamine can be made from readily
available and legal chemicals and substances, and because it poses serious dangers to both
human life and to the environment.").
107. H.R. REP. No. 109-352, at 1.
108. H.R. REP. NO. 109-299, pt. 1, at 10.
109. Id. at 13.
110. H.R. REP. No. 109-352, at 2-3; H.R. REP. NO. 109-299, pt.1, at 17-20.
111. E.g., John Tierney, Debunking the Drug War, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2005, at A19;
Jack Shafer, Crack Then. Meth Now, SLATE (August 23, 2005, 6:18 p.m.), http://www.
slate.comlid/2124885. By 2000, Congress had already adopted low quantity thresholds for
methamphetamine mandatory minimums. See infra text accompanying notes 122-26. Ac-
cordingly, Congress took a different anti-methamphetamine tack in the 2000s. See Ahrens,
supra note 104, at 843 (relating that Congress's recent anti-methamphetamine initiatives
"have either restricted the ability of potential methamphetamine manufacturers to access
the materials used to generate methamphetamine or sought to contain the effects of me-
thamphetamine use and production on innocent bystanders who might be exposed to envi-
2011] 785
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
With these heightened concerns came heightened penalties.
Methamphetamine was once sufficiently obscure that Congress
did not include it among the drugs to which the Anti-Drug Abuse
Act of 1986 assigned mandatory minimum prison terms. 2 As
promulgated one year later, the original Guidelines treated one
gram of methamphetamine as the equivalent of two grams of
powder cocaine for sentencing purposes, effectively creating a 2:1
powder-to-methamphetamine ratio."- Only in 1988 did Congress
prescribe a mandatory minimum term for trafficking crimes in-
volving methamphetamine.114 So little attention was paid to this
provision that it contained a significant typographical error; as
corrected in 1990, the law prescribed a five-year minimum term
for crimes involving ten grams or more of methamphetamine
(sometimes referred to as "methamphetamine-actual") or one
hundred grams or more of a mixture containing a detectable
amount of methamphetamine, and a ten-year minimum term for
crimes involving one hundred grams or more of methampheta-
mine or one kilogram or more of a mixture containing a detecta-
ble amount of methamphetamine.n11 Shortly thereafter, in re-
sponse to another act of Congress,116 the Commission revised the
Guidelines to create a new category of methamphetamine-"ice,"
defined as "a mixture or substance containing d-methamphet-
amine hydrochloride of at least 80% purity.""1 For sentencing
ronmental toxins and laboratory explosions").
112. Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207, 3207-2 to 3207-3. The Anti-Drug Abuse Act
only prescribed mandatory minimums for heroin, cocaine and cocaine base, phencyclidine
(PCP), lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD), fentanyl, and marijuana. Id. For a review of mod-
ern federal sentencing law as it relates to methamphetamine, see generally U.S.
SENTENCING COMM'N, METHAMPHETAMINE FINAL REPORT (1999) [hereinafter
METHAMPHETAMINE REPORT].
113. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1 cmt. 10 (1987).
114. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 6470(g)(3), 102 Stat. 4181,
4378 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (2006)). The 1988 legislation pre-
scribed that the ten-year mandatory minimum would apply to crimes involving either one
hundred grams of methamphetamine or one hundred grams of a substance containing a
detectable amount of methamphetamine. Id.
115. Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 1202, 104 Stat. 4789, 4830 (codi-
fied at 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (2006)). In passing the 1990 law, Congress expressly ac-
knowledged that it was fixing a mistake (the title of the section making the amendment
was "Correction Of An Error Relating to the Quantity of Methamphetamine Necessary to
Trigger a Mandatory Minimum Penalty"). Id. § 1202, 104 Stat. at 4830.
116. Id. § 2701, 104 Stat. at 4912.
117. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amend. 370 (1991); U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1(c) note C (2010).
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purposes, "ice" would be (and is) treated as the equivalent of "ac-
tual" or pure methamphetamine, notwithstanding its impurity."s
In any event, Congress would go still further. The Methamphe-
tamine Trafficking Penalty Enhancement Act of 1998"1 applied
the five-year mandatory minimum to trafficking crimes involving
five grams or more of methamphetamine or fifty grams or more of
a mixture containing a detectable amount of methampheta-
mine,12 0 and the ten-year mandatory minimum to crimes involv-
ing at least fifty grams of methamphetamine or five hundred
grams of a mixture containing a detectable amount of metham-
phetamine.121 This statute thus created the current 100:1 dispari-
ty between the amount of powder cocaine that will implicate the
five- and ten-year mandatory minimum sentences and the
amount of actual methamphetamine or "ice" that will produce
these results .122 With the notable exception of methamphetamine
118. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1(c) (2010).
119. Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681, 2681-759 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §
841 (2006)). Also, Congress passed the Comprehensive Methamphetamine Control Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-237, 110 Stat. 3099. In pertinent part, this Act directed the Com-
mission to "review and amend its guidelines and its policy statements to provide for in-
creased penalties for unlawful manufacturing, importing, exporting, and trafficking of me-
thamphetamine, and other similar offenses." Id. § 301(a), 110 Stat. at 3105. Just to make
certain that the Commission would get the hint, Congress added that the Commission
needed to
ensure that the sentencing guidelines and policy statements for offenders
convicted of [these offenses] reflect the heinous nature of such offenses, the
need for aggressive law enforcement action to fight such offenses, and the ex-
treme dangers associated with unlawful activity involving methampheta-
mine, including-(1) the rapidly growing incidence of methamphetamine
abuse and the threat to public safety such abuse poses; (2) the high risk of
methamphetamine addiction; (3) the increased risk of violence associated
with methamphetamine trafficking and abuse; and (4) the recent increase in
the illegal importation of methamphetamine and precursor chemicals.
Id. § 301(b), 110 Stat. at 3105.
120. Methamphetamine Trafficking Penalty Enhancement Act of 1998, Pub. L. No.
105-277, § 2, 112 Stat. 2681, 2681-759.
121. Id.
122. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(ii), (viii) (2006) (relating the relevant ten-year mandatory
minimum provisions for manufacturing, distributing, dispensing, or possessing with the
intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense these controlled substances); id. § 841
(b)(1)(B)(ii)-(viii) (relating the relevant five-year mandatory minimum provisions for these
offenses); id. § 960(b)(1)(B), (H) (relating the relevant ten-year mandatory minimum provi-
sions for importing these controlled substances); id. § 960(b)(2)(B), (H) (relating the rele-
vant five-year mandatory minimum provisions for importing these controlled substances).
Congress may go still further. In 2005, legislation was proposed that would have de-
creased to five grams the amount of methamphetamine that would implicate the ten-year
mandatory minimum, and to three grams the amount of methamphetamine that would
implicate the five-year mandatory minimum. Methamphetamine Epidemic Elimination
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that qualifies as "ice," in practice the quantity ratio is not quite as
severe as the 100:1 figure might suggest, since impurities are ad-
justed for in considering the amount of "actual" methampheta-
mine for which a defendant will be held responsible at sentencing
(whereas impurities in a given quantity of powder or crack co-
caine are not similarly discounted).123 For example, it takes ten
grams of 50% pure methamphetamine to implicate the five-year
mandatory minimum term. Even as adjusted, the quantity thre-
sholds fixed by statute ensure stiff penalties for trafficking crimes
involving small quantities of methamphetamine. Furthermore,
just as they had done with crack and powder cocaine, the Com-
mission used the statutory mandatory-minimum thresholds for
methamphetamine as benchmarks for the sentence ranges that
adhere to trafficking crimes involving greater or lesser quantities
of the drug.124 This slow accretion of methamphetamine penalties
Act, H.R. 3889, 109th Cong. § 301 (2005). However, these adjustments ultimately were
stripped from the bill. See Michael B. Cassidy, Examining Crack Cocaine Sentencing in a
Post-Kimbrough World, 42 AKRON L. REV. 105, 134 (2009). Another contemporary measure
would have reduced the amounts of a mixture containing a detectable amount of metham-
phetamine that would implicate the mandatory minimums to fifty and five grams, respec-
tively. Stop Crystal Meth Act of 2004, S. 2444, 108th Cong. (2004). In support of the latter
proposal, Senator Charles Schumer stated,
Twenty years ago, crack was headed east across the United States like a
Mack Truck out of control, and it slammed New York hard because we just
didn't see the warning signs. Well, the headlights are glaring bright off in the
distance again, this time with meth. We are still paying the price of missing
the warning signs back then, and if we don't remember our history we will be
doomed to repeat it, because crystal meth could become the new crack.
Press Release, Senator Charles Schumer, New Stats Show Crystal Meth Quickly Becom-
ing the New Crack-Seizures in New York up 31% Over Last Year (April 25, 2004), http://
schumer.senate.gov/new-website/record-print.cfm?id=265406.
123. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1(c) note B (2010). Presently, the
"average" batch of methamphetamine seized by federal agents is much less than 100%
pure, meaning that more than five grams of the substance is needed to trigger a five-year
minimum term. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING
STATISTICS tbl.42 (2009) [hereinafter 2009 SOURCEBOOK] (reflecting that the mean and
median quantities of methamphetamine associated with the 345 methamphetamine de-
fendants sentenced to Base Offense Level 26 in fiscal year 2009 was 11.0 and 10.5 grams,
respectively). However, the average purity of methamphetamine tested by the government
has sharply increased over the last five years. Michael G. Vrakatitsis, Strategic Intelli-
gence Section, Drug Enforcement Administration, Methamphetamine in 2010, http://www.
methpedia.org/download/nrlemilNRLEM-MarkKrawczyk.pdf (last visited Mar. 2, 2011)
[hereinafter Methamphetamine in 2010] (reporting that, while the average price per gram
of methamphetamine decreased 58.5% from 2007 to 2009, the average purity increased
88.2%).
124. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1(c) (2010). This enhancement of
the powder-to-methamphetamine ratio went hand-in-hand with a significant uptick in
federal prosecutions for crimes involving methamphetamine. Between fiscal year 1996 and
fiscal year 2000, the number of defendants sentenced under the mandatory minimum pro-
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means that the 100:1 ratio has not disappeared so much as it has
shifted, in sync with changing views regarding the nation's "most
dangerous" drug.
The new millennium brought yet another threat to the powder-
crack ratio, in the form of a series of decisions by the Supreme
Court of the United States holding: (1) that the Sixth Amendment
requires jury determinations as to all facts that increase the max-
imum prison term applicable to an offense;'15 (2) that this consti-
tutional rule means that the Guidelines must be understood as
advisory, rather than mandatory, insofar as they do not reflect
statutory sentencing directives;2 6 (3) that the provisions of the
Guidelines that adopt and apply the 100:1 powder-crack ratio are
likewise advisory, to the extent that they extrapolate beyond the
five- and ten-year mandatory minimum terms assigned by Con-
gress;127 and (4) that sentencing judges could reasonably voice a
categorical disagreement with the 100:1 powder-crack ratio, such
that they could sentence all defendants in crack cases to terms
well below the relevant Guidelines range (provided they still im-
posed any applicable mandatory minimum term).128 Some federal
district court judges responded to these decisions by adopting a
powder-crack ratio of 20:1129 or even 1:113o as a general rule in
visions applicable to methamphetamine increased 226%, from 1185 to 2680. Compare U.S.
SENTENCING COMM'N, SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl.38 (1996)
[hereinafter 1996 SOURCEBOOK], with U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SOURCEBOOK OF
FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl.32 (2000) [hereinafter 2000 SOURCEBOOK]. By com-
parison, over the same span the number of defendants sentenced under the mandatory
minimums applicable to crack cocaine increased only 10%, from 3677 to 4045. Compare
2000 SOURCEBOOK, supra, tbl.32, with 1996 SOURCEBOOK, supra, tbl.38.
125. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 476 (2000).
126. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005).
127. Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 110 (2007).
128. Spears v. United States, 555 U.S. 261, _, 129 S. Ct. 840, 843-44 (2009) (per cu-
riam) ("[W]e now clarify that district courts are entitled to reject and vary categorically
from the crack-cocaine Guidelines based on a policy disagreement with those Guidelines.").
129. E.g., United States v. Edwards, 693 F. Supp. 2d 575, 584 (S.D. W. Va. 2010); Unit-
ed States v. Dozier, No. S2-08-CR-008, 2009 WL 2870079, at *5-6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 2009);
United States v. Rodriguez, No. 08-CR-509, 2009 WL 1811001, at *2 (N.D. Ill. June 23,
2009); United States v. Perry, 389 F. Supp. 2d 278, 307-O8 (D.R.I. 2005); United States v.
Smith, 359 F. Supp. 2d 771, 782 (E.D. Wis. 2005).
130. E.g., United States v. Whigham, No. 06-CR-10328, 2010 WL 4959882, at *5-6 (D.
Mass. Dec. 3, 2010); United States v. Canada, No. 09-CR-30188, 2010 WL 3023503, at *7-
8 (S.D. Ill. July 30, 2010); United States v. Greer, 699 F. Supp. 2d 876, 879-80 (E.D. Tex.
2010); Henderson v. United States, 660 F. Supp. 2d 751, 752, 754-55 (E.D. La. 2009);
United States v. Medina, No. 08-CR-256, 2009 WL 2948325, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 11,
2009); United States v. Gully, 619 F. Supp. 2d 633, 644, 646 (N.D. Iowa 2009); United
States v. Lewis, 623 F. Supp. 2d 42, 45 (D.D.C. 2009); United States v. Owens, No. 08-48
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crack trafficking cases (thereby reducing the sentences imposed
on many defendants convicted of crimes involving crack), while
others continued to adhere to the sentencing ranges prescribed by
the Guidelines. 13  These variations meant that the sentence a
crack defendant would receive, when prosecuted in federal court,
often depended on the judge who had been randomly assigned the
defendant's case, and the particular powder-crack ratio the judge
chose to adopt. This additional layer of arbitrariness, atop an al-
ready seemingly arbitrary statutory distinction between powder
and crack cocaine, was difficult for some observers to swallow.132
IV. THE FAIR SENTENCING ACT OF 2010
Such were the circumstances when Congress took up the legis-
lation that would become the Fair Sentencing Act. To recap, (1)
the 100:1 disparity had emerged from a peculiar rush to enact an-
ti-drug abuse legislation more than two decades earlier, and was
premised on little more than an inchoate sense that crack was a
particularly dangerous substance; (2) by 2010, early assumptions
regarding the perils posed by crack had been called into ques-
tion;33 (3) crack use seemed to be in decline, with methampheta-
mine usurping its throne as the nation's "problem drug"; (4) Afri-
can-Americans continued to represent the lion's share of
defendants prosecuted for crimes involving crack, as compared to
the mostly Caucasian and Latino defendants charged with federal
crimes involving powder cocaine;134 (5) more than a decade's worth
Erie, 2009 WL 2485842, at *2-3 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 12, 2009); United States v. Russell, No.
06-72 Erie, 2009 WL 2485734, at *3-4 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 12, 2009); United States v. Carter,
2009 WL 2578958, at *2 (W.D. Va. Aug.18, 2009); United States v. Luck, No. 04-CR-047,
2009 WL 2462192, at *2 (W.D. Va. Aug.10, 2009).
131. See, e.g., United States v. Brewer, 624 F.3d 900, 909 (8th Cir. 2010) (affirming a
sentence where the sentencing court applied the Guidelines as written).
132. See, e.g., id. at 910 (Bright, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (com-
menting on this point).
133. See Alfred Blumstein, The Notorious 100:1 Crack: Powder Disparity-The Data
Tell Us that It Is Time to Restore the Balance, 16 FED. SENT'G REP. 87, 87, 89 (2003)
("Mhe situation of crack and crack markets has changed considerably [since 1986]. The
demand for crack by new users has declined appreciably, the activity in street markets has
correspondingly declined since the older, addicted users can be served privately, and the
level of violence associated with crack has diminished."). By 2009, crack cocaine was no
longer being described as a distinct drug or substance but as "a method of packaging
powder cocaine." REP. CONYERS, FAIRNESS IN COCAINE SENTENCING ACT OF 2009, H.R.
REP. No. 111-670, pt. 1, at 2 (2009).
134. See, e.g., 2009 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 123, tbl.34 (identifying 79% of defendants
sentenced for crimes involving crack cocaine as black, while identifying 53.2% of defen-
790 [Vol. 45:765
FAIR SENTENCING ACT OF 2010
of initiatives (coming from both sides of the legislative aisle) per-
ceived the power-crack disparity as a problem to be fixed, though
the preferred approach varied; and (6) judges had recently
gained, and begun to exercise, the authority to reject the 100:1
ratio in a variety of circumstances. Congress also signaled a new-
ly flexible attitude toward the powder-crack disparity by declin-
ing to disapprove of a Guidelines amendment, promulgated in
2007, that modestly reduced the Guidelines ranges that would
apply to defendants convicted of trafficking in crack.13 1
While none of these facts, taken individually or collectively,
mandated revision of the 100:1 ratio, they offered a compelling
argument for reconsideration of the penalties attached to crimes
involving crack cocaine. What remained was for Congress to
agree on the appropriate terms of reform and the explanation
that would accompany the action.
Of these, the latter was more easily developed: it was agreed
that the erroneous 100:1 powder-crack ratio resulted from the
flawed information about the perils of crack that Congress had
received back in 1986, together with the unusually pressing need
to pass drug legislation that year that prevented a more probing
review of the claims that were being made about the alleged crack
"epidemic."136 In hearings on the powder-crack disparity held in
2002,'13 then-Senator Joseph Biden said that in 1986, "[m]ore
dants sentenced for crimes involving powder cocaine over that span as Hispanic).
135. Previously, the base offense levels for defendants with no criminal history were
set such that a defendant involved with the minimum amount of crack necessary to impli-
cate a mandatory minimum sentence was subject to a sentencing range with a "floor" set
just above the mandatory minimum. See 2007 USSC SENTENCING REPORT, supra note 22,
at 3 & n.11. The amendment, effective November 1, 2007, reduced the base offense levels
for defendants involved with crack by two, such that, inter alia, defendants possessing
precisely the amount of crack necessary to implicate the mandatory minimum were sub-
ject to sentencing ranges with ceilings set just above the mandatory minimums. U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 2D1.1, 5A (2007). The net result was to reduce the
powder-crack weight ratio, as related throughout the Guidelines, to between 25:1 and
80:1, depending on the amounts involved. Id. at 228 supp. to app. For a discussion of this
change, see HUTCHISON ET AL., supra note 93, at 453, and also see Kimbrough v. United
States, 552 U.S. 85, 106 (describing the amendment).
136. As early as 1995, congressmen who sought reform of the powder-crack disparity
pitched their proposals as efforts to fix an "inadvertent" anomaly in the nation's drug laws.
E.g., 132 CONG. REC. S14,780 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1995) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (ob-
serving that in the rush to pass anti-drug legislation, Congress may have "inadvertently"
created an injustice with the powder-crack disparity).
137. Federal Cocaine Sentencing Policy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime and
Drugs of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 2-3 (2002) [hereinafter Federal Cocaine
Sentencing Hearings].
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than a dozen bills were introduced to increase the penalties for
crack. But because we knew so little about it, the proposals were
all over the map."'8 Biden added, "[T]he fact of the matter was
that our intentions were good. But in the rush to legislation, we
may not have gotten it right."39 Senator Jeff Sessions chimed in,
"I think that the trigger points that we had 16 years ago may
have made sense at the time. But based on our experience, they
do not make sense today, and they are not rational, such that we
can defend them."o4 0 A few years later, it was suggested by one
member of the House of Representatives that Congress would
have been regarded as racist had it not treated crack as far worse
than powder cocaine back in 1986, for to have regarded the drugs
as comparable at that time would have suggested an indifference
to a phenomenon that was disproportionately affecting inner-city
neighborhoods.'14
The precise terms of the legislation that would address the dis-
crepancy were somewhat more difficult to devise. Eventually,
however, it was agreed that (1) the threshold quantity of crack
necessary to implicate the five-year mandatory minimum would
be increased to twenty-eight grams, or approximately one ounce
(effectively creating an 18:1 powder-to-crack ratio);142 (2) a similar
upward adjustment would be made to the quantity of crack ne-
cessary for a defendant to receive a ten-year minimum term;4 1 (3)
the five-year mandatory minimum sentence applicable to mere
138. Id. at 2 (statement of Sen. Biden).
139. Id. at 3.
140. Id. at 9 (statement of Sen. Sessions). Eight years later, advocates of the Fair Sen-
tencing Act took care not to portray the disparity as racially motivated. During a floor de-
bate, Representative Scott, a longtime advocate for a 1:1 ratio at the levels set for powder
cocaine, explained, "We are not blaming anybody for what happened in 1986." 156 CONG.
REC. H6202 (daily ed. July 28, 2010) (remarks of Rep. Scott). Instead, he said, "[W]e have
had years of experience and have determined that there is no justification for the 100-to-1
ratio." Id. Representative Paul observed that the law "was designed to help people, espe-
cially the minorities that were using crack cocaine, and they thought this was terrible, and
it turned out that its law backfired. It actually hurt minorities, didn't [sic] help them." Id.
at H6203 (remarks of Rep. Paul).
141. Cracked Justice Hearing, supra note 66, at 3 (statement of Rep. Gohmert) ("[Olne
of the Members who was on the Committee back during debate of this matter 20 years ago
recalled that some Members of Congress were individually challenged that failure to pass
the bill with the tougher sentences for crack would potentially be racist for not caring
enough about African American communities to make the penalty for spreading such poi-
son in their midst far tougher than powder cocaine.").
142. Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, § 2, 124 Stat. 2372, 2372 (to be
codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1), 960(b)).
143. Id.
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possession of crack would be abolished;144 and (4) more severe pe-
nalties would apply to drug crimes involving violence, threats of
violence, or other aggravating circumstances.'4 Retention of some
disparity between crack and powder cocaine was essential to pas-
sage of the Act, because many members of Congress continued to
believe (with some justification)146 that given its customary me-
thods of distribution and administration, crack was at least
somewhat more powerful, more addictive, and more closely tied to
violent crime than powder cocaine was.47 To these Senators and
Representatives, these differences supported some distinction be-
tween powder and crack cocaine-just not a 100:1 discrepancy.148
By adopting an 18:1 ratio, instead of equalizing the penalties at-
tached to crack and powder cocaine, the measure that would be-
come the Fair Sentencing Act assuaged these concerns and facili-
tated its enactment into law.
V. CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS
The differences between powder and crack cocaine seemed im-
mense in 1986, when the mandatory-minimum quantities that
produced the 100:1 powder-crack ratio were first adopted. At the
time, prevailing wisdom held that crack was marketed differently
than powder cocaine, used differently than powder cocaine, had
different effects than powder cocaine, and produced more ancil-
lary crime than powder cocaine. Powder cocaine was a known, if
somewhat disreputable, quantity; crack was not. In this environ-
ment, the penalties associated with crack cocaine could be rat-
144. Id. § 3, 124 Stat. at 2372 (to be codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 844(a)). Signifi-
cantly, in fiscal year 2009, only thirty-two persons were sentenced under the Guidelines
for mere possession of crack. 2009 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 123, tbl.33.
145. § 6, 124 Stat. at 2373 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 994 note).
146. The Commission's reports on cocaine sentencing policy consistently noted the exis-
tence of grounds for distinguishing between powder and crack cocaine. E.g., 2007 USSC
COCAINE REPORT, supra note 22, at 36 ("Violence continues to occur more often in crack
cocaine cases than in powder cocaine cases."); id. at 62 ("[T'he risk of addiction and per-
sonal deterioration may be greater for crack cocaine than for powder cocaine because of
their different methods of usual administration."); 1995 USSC COCAINE REPORT, supra
note 22, at xiii ("[I]mportant distinctions [between powder and crack cocaine] may warrant
higher penalties for crack than powder.").
147. See REP. CONYERS, FAIRNESS IN COCAINE SENTENCING ACT OF 2009, H. REP. No.
111-670, pt. 1, at 15-19 (2009) (dissenting views).
148. See 156 CONG. REC. H6202 (daily ed. July 28, 2010) (remarks of Rep. Lungren)
(reconciling his support of Senate Bill 1789 with his opposition to a proposal that would
reduce the powder-crack ratio to 1:1).
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cheted upward without much accompanying notice to the pu-
nishment provisions affixed to crimes involving cocaine powder.
As time passed and the so-called crack "epidemic" faded, the dif-
ferences between powder and crack cocaine no longer seemed so
great,14 1 with one enormous exception: the vast majority of per-
sons charged with and sentenced for crimes involving crack were
African-American, while most individuals involved with crimes
involving powder cocaine were Caucasian or Latino.o50 According-
ly, as soon as the anti-drug furor of the late 1980s and early
1990s dissipated, those who supported lessened penalties for
crimes involving crack cocaine could logically point to the vastly
higher quantity thresholds applicable to powder cocaine as the
proper standard for all forms of the drug.
Other crimes, and punishments, lack similarly provocative
foils. Drug trafficking crimes involving methamphetamine offer a
case-in-point. Today, defendants charged with trafficking actual
methamphetamine or methamphetamine in "ice" form are subject
to a sentencing scheme that mirrors the provisions that formerly
applied to crack.'' But the Fair Sentencing Act does not signal
149. See, e.g., H. REP. No. 111-670, at 12 (additional views of Rep. Maffei) ("Based upon
the information available [in 1986], it was believed that crack and powder cocaine were
different substances and that they did in fact have a different impact. We know now, how-
ever, that as far as substances are concerned, they are basically the same.").
150. Although the racial disparity between prosecutions for crimes involving powder
cocaine on the one hand and offenses implicating crack cocaine on the other likely cata-
lyzed widespread recognition and condemnation of a powder cocaine-to-crack "ratio," it
would prove too much to attribute the Fair Sentencing Act to this factor alone. Back in
2002, Senator Jeff Sessions of Alabama said that reform of the powder-to-crack ratio was
necessary in order to avert "contempt for the law." Senator Sessions stated, "When there is
an obvious and overwhelming disparity, regardless of the intention, no matter how well-
intentioned it was, if that disparity exists, it breeds in whole communities the notion that
the law is deliberately directed at them, that the law is deliberately directed at discrimi-
nating against them." H.R. REP. No. 111-670, at 10. If taken seriously, this principle de-
mands a resurvey of large tracts of the criminal law, including but not limited to applica-
tion of the death penalty. Cf. McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987). No such
reassessment is likely to occur anytime in the near future. Accordingly, the Fair Sentenc-
ing Act must be attributed at least in part to a reassessment of whether the best available
knowledge regarding other differences between crack and powder cocaine, such as their
relative addictiveness, health consequences, and association with violent crime, continued
to justify the 100:1 ratio.
151. The cohort of federal defendants convicted of trafficking crack have, overall,
tended to receive longer sentences than those imposed on defendants convicted of federal
crimes involving methamphetamine. 2009 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 123, fig.J (indicating
an average sentence length of 114.8 months and median sentence length of 96 months for
defendants convicted of federal drug trafficking crimes involving crack cocaine in fiscal
year 2009, as compared to an average sentence length of 96.5 months and a median sen-
tence length of 72 months for defendants convicted of similar crimes involving metham-
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that Congress is now willing to reconsider the penalties affixed to
methamphetamine. The nation still considers itself in the midst
of a methamphetamine epidemic, which makes legislative reduc-
tion of the punishments tied to the drug a political nonstarter. Al-
so, unlike the penalties attached to crack, the punishments for
methamphetamine crimes lack a backstory that accommodates
and explains a good-faith error in penalty assignment. Instead,
the sentencing provisions that apply to methamphetamine
represent the product of several distinct decisions to impose se-
vere punishment upon persons convicted of crimes involving the
drug. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, methamphetamine
cannot be juxtaposed against another substance that carries a
lesser penalty quite as readily as crack cocaine can.152 Crack had
powder cocaine, a different form of the same basic substance, and
over time the lesser penalties attached to powder cocaine pulled
the punishments affixed to crack downward. Methamphetamine
seems to lack a comparable analog; crimes and punishments in-
phetamine during this period). Yet even before the Fair Sentencing Act came into effect,
less actual methamphetamine (or, for that matter, "ice") than crack was needed to trigger
a given base offense level under the Guidelines. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 2D1.1(c) (2009). In other words, first-offender defendants convicted of traffick-
ing a given amount of actual methamphetamine or "ice" have been subject to longer sen-
tences than those applicable to defendants convicted of trafficking equivalent amounts of
crack, at least if they cannot avail themselves of a "safety valve" for low-level offenders
authorized by Congress back in 1994. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of
1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 80001, 108 Stat. 1796, 1985 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)
(2006)); 2009 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 123, tbl.42.; see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 5C1.2 (2010) (incorporating the safety valve into the Guidelines). Pursuant to
the "safety valve," a defendant will be sentenced according to the Guidelines, without ref-
erence to a statutory mandatory minimum, if certain prerequisites are satisfied that relate
to both the offense and the offender. More methamphetamine defendants than crack de-
fendants qualify for the safety valve. 2009 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 123, tbl.44. On the
other hand, the Guidelines prescribe certain sentencing enhancements that apply specifi-
cally to methamphetamine, and not to any form of cocaine. E.g., U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1. 1(b)(10)(B)-(D) (2010).
152. In its most recent report to Congress on cocaine sentencing policy, the Commission
briefly commented on the penalties that adhered to methamphetamine, but did not dwell
on them. 2007 USSC COCAINE REPORT, supra note 22, at 3-6. When, back in 2002, a wit-
ness before Congress testified about the strict penalties applicable to methamphetamine
trafficking, Senator Biden quickly transformed the observation into an explanation why
the powder-crack disparity lacked discriminatory intent. Federal Cocaine Sentencing Poli-
cy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime and Drugs of the Comm. on the Judiciary,
107th Cong. 45 (2002) (remarks of Sen. Biden) ("I think the point that Mr. Otis makes is
worth making again. I guess the reason I am making it is, since I am the guy who drafted
the law, I want to make it clear, which I hope everyone understands in any community,
that it was not meant to be discriminatory.").
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volving this substance cannot be as readily connected to another
offense or penalty, at least within the legislative imagination.
That said, the Fair Sentencing Act may support a more indirect
route to reform: broader judicial recognition and scrutiny of a
powder cocaine-to-methamphetamine ratio, as adopted through-
out the Guidelines. In identifying the sentences attached to
powder cocaine as a standard for determining the reasonableness
of the penalties associated with crack, Congress implied that the
powder cocaine provisions have some bearing on the propriety of
the sentences that apply to other controlled substances. While
powder and crack cocaine are today more readily juxtaposed than
powder cocaine and methamphetamine are, it must be remem-
bered that powder cocaine and crack were once regarded as being
as different as diamonds and coal. The notion of a powder-to-
crack ratio took time to develop, and it is altogether possible that,
over time, an increased emphasis will be placed on the similari-
ties between methamphetamine and powder cocaine, instead of
their differences.
Recognition and review of a 100:1 powder cocaine-
methamphetamine ratio, as embraced within the Guidelines, now
lies within the proper scope of judicial authority. As discussed,
the Guidelines are now advisory, except to the extent that they
merely parrot sentences assigned by statute; judges may deviate
from the Guidelines upon a principled, reasoned disagreement
with a specific policy determination embedded therein.15 3 In the
specific context of federal drug laws, judges must impose statuto-
ry mandatory minimum sentences as appropriate, but otherwise
they may consider whether rote application of the Guidelines
would produce a term of incarceration that is "greater than ne-
cessary" to achieve the purposes of sentencing,154 and impose a
shorter sentence on that basis. It follows that judges have discre-
tion to inquire more closely into whether the 100:1 powder co-
caine-to-methamphetamine quantity disparity, as adopted
throughout the Guidelines as a policy determination by the
Commission, is "greater than necessary" to accomplish the aims
of sentencing as to a specific defendant or defendants generally,
as compared to a smaller ratio that would still recognize the ar-
153. Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 109 (2007).
154. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006); Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 101.
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guably greater perils associated with methamphetamine relative
to powder and crack cocaine.' 5
Of course, courts could scrutinize and ultimately disagree with
the Commission's policy decision to use the mandatory minimum
quantity thresholds for methamphetamine as benchmarks for
sentences for crimes involving other quantities of the drug, with-
out reference to any powder cocaine-to-methamphetamine ratio.
As with crack cocaine, however, framing the discussion in terms
of a ratio, with the penalties tied to powder cocaine as a basis for
comparison, helps fill in what is otherwise a missing element in
the analysis: to wit, a standard for what the "proper" penalties for
a drug trafficking offense should be, in light of the perils asso-
ciated with the substance.
Were courts to undertake this review, they might well conclude
that the 100:1 ratio is excessive, either categorically or as to a
specific defendant. Powder cocaine and methamphetamine, both
stimulants, 16 involve roughly similar dosages; indeed, the aver-
age dose of methamphetamine is heavier than the average dose of
powder cocaine, which if anything points toward a lower powder
cocaine-to-methamphetamine quantity ratio."67 Furthermore,
155. Arguably, in directing the Commission to "provide for increased penalties for un-
lawful manufacturing, importing, exporting, and trafficking of methamphetamine" back in
1996, at a time when the Guidelines already incorporated quantity thresholds that pro-
duced a 50:1 powder cocaine-to-methamphetamine ratio, Congress made a legislative de-
termination that constrains courts' authority to increase the quantities of methampheta-
mine needed to implicate a given base offense level under the Guidelines. Comprehensive
Methamphetamine Control Act of 1996, § 301, Pub. L No. 104-237, 110 Stat. 3099, 3105.
One could interpret this provision as endorsing quantity thresholds for methamphetamine
that are no higher than those found in the Guidelines at the time. On the other hand, the
measure did not expressly adopt the Guidelines quantities (or lower figures), and could be
construed as soliciting only specific enhancements that would increase the penalties for
certain subsets of methamphetamine crimes (and thus permitting the categorical recogni-
tion of quantity ratios of 50:1 or less), or as permitting the more lenient treatment of
small-scale offenders, provided that more substantial traffickers receive greater punish-
ment. More fundamentally, a congressional directive to the Commission to adopt a Guide-
line is not treated as the equivalent of a statute that relates a sentence subsequently in-
corporated into a Guideline, see United States v. Corner, 598 F.3d 411, 414-16 (7th Cir.
2010) (en banc) (observing that a Guideline qua Guideline is not legally binding, even if
Congress has directed the Commission to promulgate the Guideline), a principle that sug-
gests that an implicit congressional endorsement of an existing Guideline will not elevate
an otherwise advisory Guideline to mandatory status. Finally, even if the 1996 law means
that courts cannot recognize a ratio of less than 50:1, nothing within the measure prevents
recognition of ratios such as 75:1 or 60:1.
156. NAT'L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, METHAMPHETAMINE ABUSE AND ADDICTION 4 (2006).
157. One source relates that, with methamphetamine, "[c]ommon abused doses are
100-1000 mg/day, and up to 5000 mg/day in chronic binge use whereas with cocaine,
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while methamphetamine use is obviously inadvisable and de-
structive, evolving research suggests that use of the drug does not
invariably lead to significant, immediate health problems, or an
inability to function as a productive member of society.158 Also,
many years after the first cries of a methamphetamine "epidem-
ic," it is still the case that far fewer people report use of metham-
phetamine than admit abuse of powder cocaine.5 9 In other words,
if we are in the midst of a methamphetamine epidemic, it is a re-
markably slow-spreading plague. Undeniable differences do exist
between the two drugs and their respective effects.,o These dif-
ferences are significant, but then, powder and crack cocaine also
differ in respects that bear upon the assignment of properly cali-
brated punishment. 161 Furthermore, while methamphetamine
prosecutions do not, as a whole, present the same disparate-
impact concerns associated with the powder-crack disparity, a
reasonable policy disagreement with the Guidelines can be pre-
mised on a variety of considerations, not merely matters sounding
in race. It is at least possible that eventually, the similarities-or
at least, the lack of tremendous differences-between powder co-
caine and methamphetamine may prove sufficiently compelling
"[c]ommonly abused doses are 10-120 mg." Compare Nat'1 Highway Traffic Safety Admin.,
Drug and Human Performance Fact Sheets: Methamphetamine (and Amphetamine),
NHTSA.Gov, http://www.nhtsa.gov/people/injury/researchljobl85drugs/methamphetamine
.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2011), with Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., Drug and Hu-
man Performance Fact Sheets: Cocaine, NHTSA.GOV, http://www.nhtsa.gov/people/injury/
researchljobl85drugs/cocain.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2011).
158. E.g., Richard A. Rawson, M. Douglas Anglin & Walter Ling, Will the Methamphe-
tamine Problem Go Away?, 21 J. ADDICTIVE DISEASES 5, 8 (2001) ("These socially accepta-
ble/promoted functions of methamphetamine are quite effective for extended periods of
time. Unless users begin injecting the drug, it is possible for many individuals to take me-
thamphetamine for a period of years before intolerable negative consequences of the drug
begin to occur.").
159. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS. ET AL., RESULTS FROM THE 2009
NATIONAL SURVEY ON DRUG USE AND HEALTH: VOLUME I. SUMMARY OF NATIONAL
FINDINGS 15 (2010) (reporting that an estimated 502,000 persons aged twelve or older
used methamphetamine within a one-month span in 2009, as opposed to an estimated 1.6
million persons aged twelve or older who used cocaine during this period).
160. Some studies show that methamphetamine has a more prolonged stimulant effect
than powder cocaine. E.g., METHAMPHETAMINE ABUSE AND ADDICTION, supra note 156, at
4. Studies also show that methamphetamine has a more damaging (or at least different)
effect on the mind and body than powder cocaine. E.g., Sara L. Simon et al., Cognitive Per-
formance of Current Methamphetamine and Cocaine Abusers, 21 J. ADDICTIVE DISEASES
61, 61 (2002).
161. For example, many observers remain firmly of the view that crack is by far the
more dangerous form of cocaine. See REP. CONYERS, FAIRNESS IN COCAINE SENTENCING
ACT OF 2009, H.R. REP. NO. 111-670, at 15-19 (2009) (dissenting views).
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as to convince some judges that the 100:1 powder cocaine-to-
methamphetamine ratio bears reconsideration.
VI. CONCLUSION
The purity of trafficked methamphetamine continues to in-
crease,'62 meaning that less and less of this substance is required
to implicate the mandatory minimum terms assigned by sta-
tute.163 This trend means that the fairness of the penalty provi-
sions applicable to methamphetamine will probably be litigated
more often in the coming years. In these cases, a few judges may
break from the pack and espy in the powder cocaine-
methamphetamine gap problems similar to those that afflicted
the penalty scheme that applied to crack.164 But it would be fool-
hardy to expect the same response by Congress. Having said "sor-
ry" once with the Fair Sentencing Act, a repeat performance
seems highly unlikely.
162. Methamphetamine in 2010, supra note 123.
163. In 1998, only 134 cases implicating Guideline section 2D1.1 involved "ice."
METHAMPHETAMINE REPORT, supra note 112, at 14 n.39. The precise number of "ice" pros-
ecutions today is unknown, but the increasing purity of seized methamphetamine means
both that the number is likely increasing and that the ice-methamphetamine mixture dis-
tinction is of decreasing importance, since much of the methamphetamine mixture that
does not qualify as "ice" is nevertheless sufficiently pure as to implicate very low quantity
thresholds for mandatory minimum terms.
164. Perhaps auguring changes to come, at least one post-Kimbrough court has de-
clined to follow the Guidelines in a situation involving low-level trafficking in methamphe-
tamine mixtures, albeit on policy grounds different from those discussed in the text above.
United States v. Ortega, No. 09-CR-400, 2010 WL 1994870, at *7 (D. Neb. May 17, 2010).
Ortega involved a defendant charged with selling small quantities of methamphetamine of
approximately forty percent purity to a cooperating witness. Id. at *6. The sentencing
judge concluded that the 10:1 quantity ratio between methamphetamine mixtures and ac-
tual methamphetamine within the Guidelines no longer reflected the realities of modern
methamphetamine production and sales, in which low-level participants often came into
control of high-purity methamphetamine. Id. Accordingly, the judge sentenced the defen-
dant outside of the Guidelines range applicable to the quantity of methamphetamine in-
volved. Id. at *7.
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